Methods of Enhancing Accountability

This article originated as an article by the same name prepared by Lucy O. Chang for the NGO Handbook.

Given the growing reach and importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), it is essential that they utilize consistent and thorough methods aimed at ensuring accountability to their various stakeholders: donors, their own charter or mandate and staff, and last but certainly not least, the communities and clients they seek to help and serve. Particularly in this age of constant media influence, lapses in NGO accountability frameworks or lack of such frameworks altogether resulting in scandal can cause the public to lose faith in these institutions, thus ruining the reputation and ability of similar organizations to raise money and truly enact change.

One example of such public scandal was that of United Way of America, where then-CEO William Aramony was found guilty of 25 felony charges including conspiracy to defraud the United Way, filing false tax returns and falsifying records to hide the diversion of money; among other things, he used charitable donations to finance a lavish life style, including trips on the Concorde and an expensive condominium. United Way was hurt both by its affiliates delaying payment of voluntary dues to the national organization and public charitable contributions to both United Way and its affiliates dropping up to 30%.

Yet another example is that of American Parkinson Disease Association, where then-CEO Frank Williams was found to have quietly embezzled contribution checks worth more than one million dollars over a seven-year period. (For further information on individual scandals and their impact on these NGOs, please refer to Gibelman and Gelman’s work, Very Public Scandals: An Analysis of How and Why Nongovernmental Organizations Get in Trouble, which notes some areas in which traditional accountability and governance measures have failed.)

Definitions of accountability

As Alnoor Ebrahim of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University notes in his paper “Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs,” existing literature points to several definitions of accountability: Edwards and Hulme define it as “the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions”; Fox and Brown describe it as “the process of holding actors responsible for actions”; and Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur suggest that “accountability is both about being ‘held responsible’ by others and about ‘taking responsibility’ for oneself” (Ebrahim 2003).

Regardless of the definition chosen, however, one thing is abundantly clear: accountability is an incredibly difficult concept to put into practice. This is evidenced by the scandals noted above and the many different approaches currently in use, which are described in further detail below. NGOs will find it particularly difficult to create and put in place effective accountability frameworks given their greater number of stakeholders relative to corporate organizations, as noted above.

Key principles of accountability

In his report for the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), Ebrahim noted several key principles of accountability, each of which points to suggested practices essential to success in this area:

1. “All organizations are accountable to multiple stakeholders, and thus must prioritize their accountabilities
2. Building trust or confidence is at the heart of accountability, and should be commenced at the very beginning of any project or program
3. Accountability is a ‘chain’ that begins with shared values, vision, and goals among stakeholders
4. Accountability demonstrates transparency with information, and an explanation of that information to stakeholders
5. Accountability integrates the measure of results with mission and vision
6. NGO-Donor partnerships that focus on organizational learning can improve both accountability and effectiveness”

(Ebrahim 2004)

The first principle indicates the broad range of stakeholders to whom NGOs must be held accountable: these not only include beneficiaries and donors, but also communities, governments, the realm of public opinion, private sector organizations, their own membership and staff, volunteers, and boards. As a framework, Ebrahim categorizes these stakeholders into the following groups: “upwardly” accountable to donors, “downwardly” accountable to communities and clients, and “internally” accountable to their own missions and staff. Ebrahim notes, “Accountability is thus a relational concept, with different kinds of accountability mechanisms necessary for satisfying different stakeholders.” This requires prioritization of accountabilities, with downward accountability to communities and clients being just as crucial to upward accountability to donors, which have generally enjoyed more well-developed measures through reporting requirements and evaluations.

The second principle notes the importance of building at an early stage of a project or program. As Ebrahim points out, “The conventional approach to accountability, in which reports and evaluations are generated at the end of a project, builds fear and miscommunication rather than trust.” He suggests that partnerships among NGOs, donors, and communities, including joint planning of programs, could potentially improve downward accountability and enhance buy-in among various stakeholders, leading to long-term effectiveness.

The third principle highlights the importance of relationships built on a “deeper collective commitment to social change.” Ebrahim notes that the chain accountability need not be linear but can in fact be circular and inter-connected, with links bound together by a common set of goals. He feels this chain “makes it possible to develop performance measures and indicators that are meaningful and valued by key parties”; these measures may prove easier to accept if they are balanced by a sense of mutual commitment among the links on the chain.

In his fourth principle, Ebrahim notes that the mere provision of information is insufficient transparency for the purposes of accountability. Accountability requires information be provided in a manner meaningful to each of the stakeholders, with separate formats and details based on what is important to that stakeholder community. Further, accountability requires not only information about activities and decisions, but further response to concerns relayed by the various stakeholders. If it is not possible to address all concerns, then prioritization of accountability (as referenced in Principle 1) becomes crucial.

Ebrahim’s fifth principle expands on his fourth principle, noting that NGOs often use reports to justify existing programs rather than as tools with which to improve effectiveness and achievement of mission. NGOs must consider which results can truly inform and how those results can be used to improve activities and effectiveness. Some of this can also be addressed through format, as discussed above.

The sixth and final principle looks forward to long-term effectiveness. Ebrahim believes that “a focus on organizational learning offers an approach that is more constructive and positive than punitive approaches to accountability.” Prevailing approaches to accountability which focus on rewarding “short term-demonstrations of success” with additional funds fail to require critical evaluation of failures with an eye towards improvements: this latter evaluation is crucial to long-term effectiveness. Partnerships that value such honest scrutiny based on an environment of trust rather than punishment can offer greater opportunities for long-term success.

For further explanation of these six principles, please refer to the Alnoor Ebrahim’s report, “Seeking NGO-Donor Partnership for Greater Effectiveness and Accountability”.

A number of different methodologies and practices are currently utilized by NGOs around the world aimed towards increasing accountability within the NGO for the benefit of some or all of its stakeholders: some of the most common are expanded upon below.

Voluntary Code of Conduct as Guidelines

BNET, the business-oriented division of CNET Networks, defines code of conduct as “a statement and description of required behaviors, responsibilities, and actions expected of employees of an organization or of members of a professional body” (BNET). The definition further states, “A code of conduct usually focuses on ethical and socially responsible issues and applies to individuals, providing guidance on how to act in cases of doubt or confusion” (BNET).

Many NGOs have chosen to enact codes of conduct, alone or in conjunction with other methods, as a means of publicly stating their objectives and common standards of practice and creating criteria upon which their performance can be judged. In a piece for the Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), Nick Leader, a research fellow at HPN, notes the following three events as particularly noteworthy in the history of the current emergence of codes, particularly when NGOs work in areas of conflict:

• Since the late 1980s, there has been a huge increase in the number of humanitarian agencies working in areas of conflict. One of the most important results was the original Red Cross NGO Code of Conduct. Developed and finally agreed upon in 1994, this Code of Conduct was a response to concerns raised by established agencies working in the Sudan in the 1980s – notably International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and Oxfam – that much of the work being done was of “low quality” and required some mechanism to raise standards
• As work in these conflict zones has increased, specialized problems have emerged and concerns that this work could be construed as “fueling conflict” convinced many that some mechanism was necessary to protect the status of NGOs and their volunteers as neutral in the relevant conflict. The Rwandan Goma camps of 1994 in particular were an important example of this necessity. Fueled by billions of dollars in aid contracts from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), many international NGOs descended on the Rwandan Goma camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) to aid fleeing Hutu refugees from Rwanda. As the conflict between the Hutu and ethnic Tutsis of Rwanda continued, the Hutu were able to use the refugee camps as a source of support, enlisting refugee members on their side, importing weapons and raising funds through the sale of relief items while using the camps as de facto safe havens protected by relief agencies. The relief agencies themselves were distracted by the increasing competition for lucrative relief contracts, and their inaction with respect to these activities drew criticism from the Tutsi-Rwandan government and Western human rights activists.
• Throughout the period in the Sudan and later Rwandan crisis with the Goma camps, it became increasingly evident that NGOs confronted a “vacuum of regulation” during conflicts and after states collapsed, meaning that these organizations and the citizenry of these areas themselves lacked a regulatory and protective environment, resulting at times in “flagrant abuse of the rules of war by parties to a conflict.” (Leader 2007)

Types of Codes of Conduct

Leader (2007) further breaks out codes into the following types:

• Country Specific versus Universal Codes: As their names imply, country specific codes concern themselves with the specific problems of a given region and focus on specific needs addressed by organizations within that region, while universal codes aim to give general codes of conduct applicable across regions and specific needs. Both types of codes fail to provide detailed protocols or guidelines. Examples of Country Specific codes include the Ground Rules, JPO, and the Sierra Leone Code; Universal Codes include examples such as Sphere or the Red Cross NGO code
• General Statements of Principle versus Detailed Statements of Performance Standards: General Statements of Principle, as its name implies, aim to provide an indication of overall goals and standards of performance for the operations of a specific NGO. Detailed Statements of Performance Standards are more rigorous, requiring those agencies to work towards detailed standards of performance across a number of technical areas. One example of General Statements of Principle is the Red Cross NGO code; Sphere and the People in Aid code are two examples of Detailed Statements of Performance Standards
• Internal versus External Codes: Internal codes apply only to the NGO in question, both its methods and staff; external codes, on the other hand, seek not only to influence the behavior of the NGO members but also that of external parties, sometimes making them signatories to the code itself. External codes are particular relevant to the NGOs operating in conflict areas, as the warring parties may also be signatories and thus held accountable based on the code. Leader notes that such external reach is the “least effective area for codes”, as these codes do not have the regulatory power to enact peace (Leader 2007).

Adopting a Code of Conduct for your Organization

NGOs have generally taken two routes with respect to adoption of codes of conduct.

One option is to create a code of conduct tailored specifically to the goals and mission of a particular NGO, potentially seeking examples from existing codes of conduct. This can often be a very time-consuming task, with the organization placing a tremendous burden on itself to work with all parties to ensure that the code is written in a credible, accurate and purposeful way. For some useful suggestions on writing your own code of conduct, please refer to Christopher MacDonald’s article, “Considerations for Writing a Code of Ethics.” Although originally designed for a corporate audience, his advice and points of concern are still quite applicable to NGOs.

Another option presented to NGOs is to act as a voluntary signatory to a consortium or umbrella group’s code of conduct, either at the time of inception or afterwards. This second approach would particularly be valuable to smaller organizations that can benefit from the added legitimacy of larger group of signatories and may lack the internal and external support to develop their own code. In this instance, the code of conduct would be used in concert with either self-certification, certification, or accreditation methodologies to enhance accountability; each will be described in further detail below as it relates to a code of conduct. Assuming compliance and relevance of the code to the mission of the NGO, adoption of an established code will enable an organization to gain virtually instant credibility with a larger community.

Enacting a Successful Code of Conduct

Literature on codes of conduct note several important keys to success, among them opt-in, or discussion and approval of the code, from the various stakeholders and other agencies, implementation of suggested procedures, and ways to ensure compliance with the code once signed.

Widespread opt-in can be achieved through often lengthy discussion with other agencies and stakeholders. Opt-in establishes clear rules of conduct among all parties and affirms the mission and presence of the NGO. This discussion also permits stakeholders to feel ownership in the organization and its objectives and provides the opportunity for the code to encompass all the relevant issues perceived by all affected parties. Legitimacy of a code is clearly impacted by the process through which it is established, with this process proving crucial to its eventual adoption (Ebrahim 2003). Leader notes an interesting phenomenon with respect to opt-in to codes: he notes that there is often an “element of compulsion to opt-in”, with agencies concerned over their reputation and some donors requiring an organization to be signatory to a code before any disbursement of monies (Leader 2007). This is one area where the potential benefits to adopting a previously established code become obvious, particularly to a smaller organization: incorporating this type of information and creating the proper incentives for compliance are extremely resource-intensive, requiring a significant period of time and potentially large financial cost as the various stakeholder elements must review and approve elements of the code.

Implementation of any process is key to its success. Leader notes that, particularly with “shorter, vague and more general codes”, not enough thought is given during the creation of a code to the costs and new procedures associated with its correct implementation (Leader 2007). More detailed codes, however, can prevent wide-spread opt-in, as agencies require more time to think through the necessary changes. Leader also stresses that agencies must carefully think through the effects of signing on to a code and further develop strategies for its implementation and any other requisite initiatives required, such as training (Leader 2007). As you explore the various methodologies available to your organization in enhancing accountability, it is crucial that you not overlook the importance of a clear plan of implementation and, once implemented, evaluation of that process.

Compliance is essential; without compliance by its signatories, a code is effectively useless. Leader notes, “Probably the weakest area of codes is what happens when a signatory breaks them” (Leader 2007). NGOs do not have the benefit of regulatory power over their signatories: the most they can do is expel them and note publicly their failure to comply with that code, and this power varies according to the code. Given an NGO’s inability to truly punish non-compliant members, some view codes as relatively ineffectual. Further, as Leader again notes, even the methods of detecting non-compliance are insufficient, as all codes to date rely on a “complaints driven” process, with other agencies reluctant to report others for non-compliance (Leader 2007). This is yet another area where adopting established codes of conduct can work to the benefit of your organization. Leader stresses that codes require “an independent compliance mechanism and the threat of publicity if codes are broken.”

Self-Certification Self-certification must work in concert with a predetermined set of goals and values. For example, Ebrahim notes the process of InterAction, the largest coalition of US-based international nongovernmental organizations focused on the world’s poor and most vulnerable people, whereby implementation of its code of conduct is based on self-certification, subject to review by a Standards Committee which also has the power to investigate complaints of non-compliance (Ebrahim 2003). Thus, self-certification works in concert with a previously established code of conduct which serves as the benchmark for performance. Catherine Shea and Sandra Sitar, Program Director and Program Administrator respectively at the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, note some key strengths of self-certification, namely its low cost, ease of administration for both the organization under review and the reviewing parties, and wide accessibility (Shea and Sitar 2004). On the surface, as long as there is a predetermined set of principles and criteria, self-certification is certainly one of the most easily implemented methodologies: it does not require tremendous new capital investment and can be completely coordinated and contained within the organization itself. Further, this methodology can be applied to many types of NGOs, without regard to their exact mission, as it requires no additional training or external expert involvement. However, there is clearly an important weakness to self-certification: its success in evaluating accountability is solely dependent on the seriousness with which the participants taking account take this process. If this process is not conducted correctly and with the utmost care, the results of the process will not be useful and, perhaps worse, any problems in accountability are not likely to surface. Some NGOs utilizing self-certification programs include: • InterAction (also now using Self-certification Plus in a pilot format) • Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) • Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organizations • Association of Children’s Organizations in the Republic of Macedonia (ACORM) • Fundacion Lealtad’s Guia de al Transparencia, which serves as a guide to Spanish NGOs

Proper compliance with these codes as verified through self-certification can include enhanced credibility and recognition within the larger NGO community and constituent groups, perhaps resulting in the attraction of new and/or bigger donors. This can be accomplished through referral of this compliance in their promotional materials and the publishing of compliant organizations in the publications of these larger groups. Interestingly, some, such as ACORM, will also use their publications against non-compliant organizations, punitively drawing attention to these shortcomings to that same larger audience.

Certification In their paper, Monica Blagescu, Lucy de Las Casas, and Robert Lloyd, Programme Manager, Project Officer, and Project Officer respectively of One World Trust, note an “emerging trend towards organizations evaluating against externally set standards”(Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd 2005). External certifications introduce a presumably neutral third party, often a peer organization, to the process, thus enhancing credibility, at least to a certain extent. However, success of this type of program can have a high cost and require high standards, as presumably experienced and independent evaluators work to identify and correct weaknesses in the organization related to compliance with their standards (Shea and Sitar 2004). Based on Shea and Sitar’s work, there are two large camps of external certification methodologies utilized to date: • Certification Programs with Government Recognition • Certification of Organizations Soliciting Funds from the Public

(Shea and Sitar 2004)

Certification Programs with Government Recognition represent instances where an NGO has been given additional legitimacy with which to initiate a certification program to monitor accountability. These are generally country-specific programs which have been entitled to bestow additional benefits to recognized NGOs. Shea and Sitar note two examples of organizations utilizing these types of programs: the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP) and the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) (Shea and Sitar 2004). PCP receives official authorization to act as a “certification agency” by the government of Pakistan. Under 2002 amendments to the Income Tax Act, certification by PCP through its NPO Certification Programme can provide a basis for tax exemption (Shea and Sitar 2004). Similarly, the Government of the Philippines has authorized PCNC to certify NGOs for tax benefits: in fact, despite concerns regarding the pace of certification by PCNC, an NGO operating in the Philippines cannot receive tax benefits without this certification. It is interesting to note that the impetus for the PCNC program was a government threat to remove the tax-benefit status of all NGOs in the country, as they stated it was impossible to distinguish legitimate NGOs from mere tax shelters (Shea and Sitar 2004). Clearly, tax exempt status and benefits provide an important incentive for NGOs to comply with these organizations and receive their certification: non-compliance is simply financially inefficient. Other brands of certification are aimed at NGOs that focus fundraising efforts to a broad audience within their country. In addition to seeking accountability, these certification programs enable an NGO to enhance their general credibility with and sometimes access to the general public audience. Three examples of these types of programs are France’s La Charte de deontologie, the German Central Institute for Social Issues’ (DZI) Donation Seal, and Give India. The “Charte” of France established a committee of organizations that monitors compliance with a code of ethics regarding broad fundraising; this committee is then charged with oversight regarding violations of the charter and has the power to allow or refuse use of a “label” on their fundraising literature that symbolizes compliance with this code (Shea and Sitar 2004). DZI similarly issues a “Donation Seal” denoting compliance with its standards and publicly recognizes recipient organizations by printing their names in a semiannual bulletin. Clearly these certifications are expected to give an additional layer of credibility to an organization as it corresponds with the public, stressing independent review of its accountability procedures. Give India utilizes a somewhat different approach: in exchange for compliance with their Credibility Alliance’s norms, an organization is granted access to their web-based donation service, enabling them to potentially garner additional funds. In this instance, the incentive for compliance is potentially very valuable financially, expanding their potential donor base through alliance with a third-party organization that essentially vouches for their procedures pursuant to their norms (Shea and Sitar 2004).

Accreditation Accreditation and Certification are very similar. Both are voluntary schemes in which an external party evaluates a given organization relative to certain established benchmarks. Further, compliance with norms under both schemes can enhance the credibility of a given organization to the larger world of NGOs and potential donors. Examples of this methodology include the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International (HAP-I), People in Aid, and the AusAid Accreditation Scheme. Organizations seeking accreditation by HAP-I agree to seven accountability principles and are evaluated against these principles by the HAP-I secretariat. If the secretariat concludes the organization is not meeting its targets, they can be expelled from the scheme (Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd 2005). People in Aid is generally similar, requiring compliance with a code of practice that sets standards for relief and development organizations comprised of seven principles. However, there is a key difference: People in Aid’s review process is geared towards institutional learning rather than a simple pass/fail regime: thus, a given organization cannot lose its accreditation based simply on an evaluation’s results (Blagescu ,de Las Casas, and Lloyd 2005). AusAid is different from both, as it benefits from government recognition. As noted above, under certification, government recognition can bestow financial incentives for compliance with a recognized organization’s norms. Compliance with AusAid’s norms include recognition of a Code of Conduct for Nongovermental Development Organizations, maintenance of a board of directors according to certain stated criteria, and “capacity to deliver on its project objectives in a manner that meets its contractual obligations through appropriate risk management and decision making process” (Shea and Sitar 2004). Accreditation under AusAid’s scheme provides eligibility for funding under the AusAid NGO Cooperation Program based on either base or full accreditation: those with full accreditation are eligible for funding with fewer restrictions, whereas, for example, an NGO with base accreditation may only be eligible for a maximum award of about $100,000 as set by an annual planning figure (Shea and Sitar 2004). Requests for full accreditation can require further review, including the use of consultants and assessors at all overseas sites. It should be noted that an NGO with base accreditation may apply for full accreditation two years from the date of the original decision. Accreditation has a somewhat different purpose in health care services and managed care. Health services and managed care organizations represent a somewhat unique problem, subject to specific legal and regulatory processes. Accreditation is frequently “developed by a professional group or industry as a self-regulatory alternative to more restrictive and extensive public regulatory or licensure requirements” (Pawlson et al. 2005). Thus, in this sector, accreditation has a very different purpose from the examples listed above: although still designed to enhance credibility, in this case its requirements are actually designed to be friendlier to the organization itself than the relevant alternative of licensure. Accreditation by a third party agency can provide significant assurance to donors to that NGO. However, it is a relatively expensive mechanism, and may prove out of reach for many smaller organizations.

Ratings Organization Evaluation/Watchdog Agencies In this methodology, an independent agency solicits information from the organization under review and then rates it according to their standards, publishing its conclusions on the agency’s compliance. As Shea and Sitar keenly observe, successful use of this method hinges upon the credibility of the rating organization (Shea and Sitar 2004). The rating agency’s standards and rating system are developed internally and then simply applied to an NGO as a gauge for measuring performance. In fact, this method does not always require the participation of the organization under review; many however, do allow some input from that organization, particularly in the form of voluntarily provided information. Ratings are conveyed to the general public, notably donors to these organizations. Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd note that one example of such an agency: Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS), a “leading inspection, verification, testing and certification company for the private sector” (Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd 2005). SGS has recently expanded into the non-profit sector with a benchmarking tool that “provides independent assessment against a number of dimensions drawn from international NGO best practices” (Blagescu, de Las Casas, and Lloyd 2005). The criteria are grouped into four large areas: operational components; contributor’s expectations; management components; and steps towards organizational improvement. The NGO itself conducts an initial assessment whose results are then verified through a five-day audit process. This tool permits the NGO to measure their progress against specific benchmarks and then urges them to raise those standards further. Clearly SGS has established a solid reputation in the private sector: it remains to be seen whether that reputation will transfer to the non-profit sector. Further, their effectiveness will also be determined by their ability to disseminate these ratings to the general public. Shea and Sitar note another example in their work: ForeignAid.com (Shea and Sitar 2004). ForeignAid.com has developed a “NGO Star™ Evaluation System” to measure organizations according to their social impact. Evaluation is completed with input from the organization under review in the forms of both an application and in-house analysis with evaluation based on the dimensions identified by ForeignAid.com; input from ForeignAid.com’s network of donors, international organizations, and academic and community leaders; and a reference check with comments from ForeignAid.com. The ratings scale goes from “C” to “AAA”, with organizations receiving a rating of “BB” or higher considered “ForeignAid certified.” ForeignAid.com then features a list of these certified organizations in their “Global Catalog of Philanthropy,” disseminating the results to their general audience (Shea and Sitar 2004).

Award Programs Award programs are exactly as their name implies: an organization can seek to win a public award, sometimes accompanied by a monetary grant of some kind, from an internationally recognized program based on review of their best practices and impact against various stated benchmarks. In order to be successful, the grantor organization must be able to draw significant attention to their award program and its recipients. In fact, the high public visibility afforded by these programs to its recipients is one of the keys to its effectiveness. The hope is that these awards will draw attention to model organizations and, in particular, the high standards embraced by the grantor organization. One example of an award program is the Baldrige National Quality Program. These three awards may be presented annually by the President of the United States in each of these categories: manufacturing, service, small business, education, health care and nonprofit. The criteria are as follows: • Leadership • Strategic Planning • Customer and market focus • Measurement, analysis, and knowledge management • Workforce focus • Process management • Results (http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/baldfaqs.htm)

Although this award does not come accompanied with a financial prize, the publicity and exposure granted to recipients is hugely beneficial; furthermore, receipt of this award notes the organization’s best practices and could lead to greater donations. Other award programs with monetary prizes include the Resource Alliance & Khemka Foundations’ India NGO Award, the Social Inclusion Trust Fund’s NGO Innovation Award, and the Red Ribbon Award.

Arguably the prime beneficiaries of award programs are the candidate and recipient organizations. Award programs claim that even candidates for these awards benefit tremendously from trying to comply with standards designed to make that organization more sustainable for the future. However, this method can prove costly, even prohibitively so, for some organizations. Expense to the grantor organization is obvious; however, a Booz Allen Hamilton study on the Baldrige National Quality Award also noted significant costs to applicants incurred while these applicants sought to comply with the particulars of the Criteria for Performance Excellence. They also found that recipients had unexpected costs, in the form of heightened expectation and various expenses incurred through participation in annual and regional conferences, as requested by the award administrator, in this case the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Shea and Sitar 2004).

Information Agencies Information Agencies seek to simply provide a public good: they collect and organize relevant information about NGOs in an effort to better educate the full public of their activities. These agencies do not provide ratings or conclusions related to any particular agency; they merely provide the data so others can judge for themselves. Obviously, the success of these agencies is dependent on two things: their relay of accurate and pertinent information and their ability to reach a very broad audience. Ideally, these services should be free to all end consumers. One example of such an agency is GuideStar.org. According to their website, GuideStar provides free access to information on 1.7 million nonprofit organizations, including compensation reports, news related to reporting requirements, and tax filings. The benefit is clear: the website makes it relatively easy to perform due diligence on an NGO of interest, a task that can be fairly cumbersome if performed through a simple internet search. The agency does not take sides; instead, there is an implicit commitment to accurately relay all pertinent information, whether positive or negative to the organization itself.

It is clear that an NGO has numerous options when tackling the task of enhancing accountability. Any of the methodologies described above, as well as combinations of them, can help an NGO to obtain enhanced credibility with various stakeholders and create meaningful systems of accountability within their organization. Once established, however, it is important that the process itself undergo periodic evaluation: this will ensure that compliance becomes a seamless process as the organization develops. For further information on various evaluative methods and their relative strengths and weaknesses, please see “Evaluation in International Organisations [sic]: Background Research for the Evaluation Dimension” by Monica Blagescu, Lucy de Las Casas and Robert Lloyd. As further research is done in this area, other possible mechanisms may also emerge as powerful options, such as multi-stakeholder alliances, government-led models, and legal and regulatory mechanisms. Jane Nelson, in her article “Effecting Change through Accountable Channels,” provides some insight into these potential mechanisms. This is clearly an issue of critical importance to any NGO, whether it is a new or well-established organization. Careful consideration of the various methodologies discussed can only serve to enhance the organization and create a sustainable environment.

WORKS CITED

Blagescu, Monica, Lucy de Las Casas, and Robert Lloyd. Evaluation in International Organisations[sic]: Background Research for the Evaluation Dimension. London: One World Trust, 2005.

BNET Business Dictionary; available from http://dictionary.bnet.com; Internet, accessed 1 February 2008.

Ebrahim, Alnoor. “Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs.” World Development 31 (2003): 813-29.

________. Seeking NGO-Donor Partnership for Greater Effectiveness and Accountability. Alexandria: Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) and Sustainable Development Department (SDS), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 2004.

Leader, Nick, “Codes of Conduct: Who Needs Them?” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 13, March 1999 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1065; Internet; accessed 24 September 2007.

Pawlson, L. Gregory, MD, Phyllis Torda, MA, Joachim Roski, PhD, and Margaret E. O’Kane. “The Role of Accreditation in an Era of Market-driven Accountability.” The American Journal of Managed Care 11 (May 2005): 290-93.

Shea, Catherine, and Sandra Sitar. NGO Accreditation and Certification: The Way Forward? An Evaluation of the Development Community’s Experience. Washington, D.C.: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2004.

LIST OF ADDITIONAL READINGS

Gibelman, Margaret, DSW, and Sheldon R. Gelman, Ph.D. “Very Public Scandals: An Analysis Of How and Why Nongovernmental Organizations Get in Trouble.” Dublin: International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR). 2000.

MacDonald, Chris, Ph.D. “Considerations For Writing A Code of Ethics.” In Streetwise Small Business Book of Lists, ed. Gene Marks. Cincinnati: Adams Media, 2006. Also available online at http://www.ethicsweb.ca/codes/writing-a-code-of-ethics.html.

Nelson, Jane. “Effecting Change Through Accountable Channels.” Washington, D.C.: Brookings Blum Roundtable. 2007.

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